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Poverty, Livelihoods and 
Vulnerability in Northern 
Ghana
Ghana was one of the first countries in Africa to embark 
on structural adjustment reforms. 25 years on, its 
continuing commitment to reform for national economic 
development has yielded impressive gains in growth and 
poverty reduction. Poverty in the country is measured 
through periodic Ghana Living Standards Surveys (GLSS). 
In 1991/92 GLSS3 found that 51.7% of the population 
were living below the national poverty line. By 1998/99 
(GLSS4) this had fallen to 39.5% and by 2005/06 (GLSS5) 
it had fallen to 28.5% (Ghana Statistical Service 2007). In 
absolute terms the number of poor people in Ghana has 
fallen from 7.9 million in 1991/92 to 6.2 million in 2005/06. 
At current growth rates, Ghana should achieve MDG1 
before 2010.
However, the fall in poverty has not been experienced 
equally around the country. GLSS5 figures show poverty 
headcount rates in the five southern regions of the 
country of between 12% (Greater Accra) and 20% 
(Ashanti, Central, Eastern, Western). These regions have 
all seen dramatic falls in poverty since 1991/92 due to 
urban growth, minerals extraction and, in the recent 
survey period, a boom in the cocoa sector in response 
to higher world prices and domestic market reforms and 
production support. The “transitional” regions, Brong 
Ahafo and Volta, have also witnessed impressive falls in 
poverty to around 30% in 2005/06. However, poverty in 
the three northern regions - Northern, Upper East and 
Upper West – remains stubbornly high at 52-88%. In 
2005/06 the three northern regions accounted for just 
under 22% of the population, but 45% of the headcount 
poor, 57% of the headcount extreme poor and 80% of 
extreme poverty severity1 in the country (Ghana Statistical 
Service 2007).
The livelihood classification used by GLSS shows 
poverty to be concentrated amongst “food crop farmers”, 
who are encountered disproportionately (but not exclu-
sively) within the three northern regions. This group 
accounted for 43% of the population in 2005/06, but 
69% of the headcount poor. Whilst the poverty rate 
amongst “food crop farmers” (68%) and “export crop 
farmers” (64%) was similar in 1991/92, by 2005/06 it had 
fallen to just 24% amongst the latter group, but was still 
46% amongst the former. Poverty in Ghana is thus 
increasingly concentrated in the three northern regions, 
remote from Accra and international markets (although 
well placed for cross-border trade with Sahelian coun-
tries), and relatedly amongst households for whom 
production of low value food crops is a major livelihood 
activity.
Shepherd et.al. (2005) use GLSS4 data to show the 
dependence of households in the three northern regions 
on semi-subsistence agriculture. In 1998/99 70-80% of 
households in the three northern regions stated that 
agriculture was their main source of livelihood, compared 
with around 45% for the country as a whole. The share 
of household incomes in the north deriving from wages 
and non-farm activities was significantly lower than 
Ghana’s average, with less than 20% of households 
having any income from non-farm self employment and 
less than 5% having any wage income. Nearly half of 
northern households did receive some income from 
remittances (the most common income source outside 
of agriculture), but the incomes received from remit-
tances are low and are rarely sufficient to enable 
accumulation2.
A 2007 study by Ministry of Food and Agriculture 
(MoFA) disaggregates households in 16 predominantly 
northern districts of the country according to their liveli-
hood strategies3. These strategies are summarised in 
Table 1 below.
Qualitative information collected during the survey 
indicated that the so-called “vulnerable” group4 typically 
start with few inherited assets5 and/or have to cope with 
disability, then may be hit by further shocks, such as 
drought, bush fire, malaria, an accident, widowing or the 
loss of animals through theft. Many no longer engage 
in agriculture at all. They struggle to obtain enough food 
every March-July and depend on family or community 
assistance. This is weaker for those who have migrated 
to town. In general, these people are not (now) mobile 
due to lack of resources; hence youth economic migrants 
in this group are those who migrated and got stuck in 
poverty at their destination - not those who might try 
migrating in the immediate future.
The “poor” group are more dependent on agriculture 
than the so-called “vulnerable”, but are constrained by 
lack of labour (sometimes land) and hence are unable 
to accumulate capital. MoFA (2007) see them as pursuing 
a “survival strategy”, rather than a “development strategy”. 
By contrast, the “medium” group can pursue a “develop-
ment strategy” based on saving through livestock (with 
resources acquired from crop sales or livestock 
husbandry), leading to both farm and non-farm invest-
ment. Most households within this “medium” group have 
adequate labour capacity, so are responsive to commer-
cial farming opportunities. Others may have one good 
non-farm income, but their ability to save and invest is 
constrained by a high dependency ratio.
Those households relying heavily on agriculture for 
their livelihoods are vulnerable in particular to climatic 
shocks, such as bushfires, droughts and floods, some-
times with more than one of these calamities falling in 
one year6. Other risks arise from market volatility, the 
rising price of agricultural inputs, and human risks such 
as susceptibility to disease and malnutrition (NDPC, 
2004). Where they are able, households take measures 
to reduce their exposure to risk (for example, diversifying 
their income sources through migration and remittances, 
planting improved seed varieties or multi-cropping). 
Coping strategies obviously depend on the shock in 
question, but include: sale of assets, including livestock; 
reduction in food intake; engaging in petty trade; migra-
tion; children dropping out of school to enter the informal 
labour market; self-medication or use of unorthodox 
medicine, and reliance on families, CBOs or NGOs for 
assistance.
The MoFA (2007) study team asked respondents what 
they would do if they received a windfall lump sum 
payment7. The majority of respondents from “vulnerable” 
households indicated that they would buy food for their 
families or engage in petty trading. Some indicated that 
they would invest in an agricultural production activity 
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(livestock rearing or crops), but the modest numbers 
reflect their lack of complementary assets (labour, land) 
and/or their limited ability to bear the risk involved in 
agricultural production. By contrast, the majority of 
responses from “poor” households involved some form 
of agricultural investment: expand their food crop farm, 
rear/buy small ruminants, rear/buy poultry, buy agricul-
tural inputs or hire farm labour. The top non-agricultural 
suggestions amongst “poor” households were engaging 
in petty trading, buying food for their families or paying 
for school fees. A larger majority of responses from the 
“medium” group also involved agricultural investment 
(with similar priorities), with expanding trade or business 
being the top non-agricultural suggestion. Amongst the 
“well-off” group, agricultural and non-agricultural invest-
ments were indicated about equally. 
These responses illustrate that, whilst food crop agri-
culture is associated with poverty nationally, many 
households in northern Ghana still see agriculture as 
offering them their best opportunity for economic 
advancement. This is especially true for those with limited 
capital to invest and/or with limited education. The 
converse of this is that there is a lack of non-agricultural 
opportunities for such households. Indeed, Shepherd 
et.al. (2005)’s review of growth opportunities in northern 
Ghana highlighted agriculture as the main source of 
available opportunities (despite the challenges that agri-
culture faces). Other opportunities may be found in 
minerals or tourism, but these are unlikely to employ 
many people.
This snapshot of northern Ghanaian livelihoods shows 
that many households are heavily dependent on 
agriculture and see limited opportunities outside of the 
agricultural sector. However, they are unable to climb 
out of poverty due to low asset levels (including labour 
and land) that reduce the possibilities for saving and 
investment in a highly risky environment where shocks 
regularly force them to liquidate their assets or divert 
them away from agriculture simply in order to survive. 
Meanwhile, a smaller proportion of households do not 
have the assets to engage in crop agriculture at all.
Agriculture in Northern 
Ghana: Why Does Semi-
Subsistence Food 
Production Predominate?
In the 1970s northern Ghana was seen as having the 
potential to supply the whole country with agricultural 
produce. The state, therefore, invested in a number of 
agro-processing ventures in the north, as well as 
supporting agriculture (especially grains production) 
through subsidised tractor services and fertilisers and 
through providing a degree of market support through 
the purchasing activities of the Ghana Food Distribution 
Corporation (GFDC). Many of these interventions were 
judged ineffective in stimulating agricultural develop-
ment and, as they were also costly, were terminated 
during the structural adjustment reforms of the 1980s 
and early 1990s.
With the withdrawal of these supports, however, there 
has effectively been no strategy for agricultural (or 
wider?) development in the three northern regions 
Group Characteristics Assets Activities
Vulnerable 
(5%)
high proportion of orphans, 
school  drop - outs,  youth 
economic migrants, widows 
with children, elderly, handi-
capped, sick
0-0.5 acres of land per active 
member; no livestock except 
0-5 poultry; basic house + 
cooking equipment and 
clothes only
sale of firewood, making baskets 
or ropes, collecting wild products, 
sheanut gathering, buy/sell 
foodstuffs
Poor (35%) high proportion of widows with 
children, youth semi-permanent 
migrants, migrants creating 
farms outside their tribal areas, 
small-scale farmers with weak 
labour capacities
0.3-2.5 acres per active 
member; 0-5 sheep/goats, 0-3 
cattle (per household). Bicycle, 
roofing sheets.
food crops and livestock farming, 
petty trading,  col lec t ion/
processing/sale of NR products, 
seasonal and semi-permanent 
migration
Medium 
(51%)
large family and high labour 
capacity (i.e. low dependency 
ratio).
1.5-4 acres per active member; 
10-40 sheep/goats, 3-30 cattle; 
(semi-)permanent house; 
modest education and assets 
(e.g. sewing machine, shop, 
TV).
farm and non-farm activities
Well-off 
(9%)
large family and high labour 
capacity, higher proportion of 
skilled labour
1-25 acres per active member; 
0-120 sheep/goats, 0-1000 
cattle; larger, permanent 
house with water, electricity, 
kitchen, toilet, fridge; tractor, 
car/truck. May have two 
houses - one in town, more 
modest on farm
Agricultural: perennial (cocoa, 
rubber, mango), non-traditional 
or food crops (all on commercial 
scale); livestock (incl. commercial 
poultry). Non-agric: tractor or 
transport services, medium-large 
scale trading, shop/house rental, 
salaried positions
Source: MoFA (2007)
Table 1. Livelihood Strategies of Households in Northern Ghana
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Except of course the targeted smallholder development 
projects funded by IFAD and GoG. As already noted, 
agricultural production in these regions remains domi-
nated by semi-subsistence production of staple food 
crops. The large commercial rice farms of the 1970s in 
particular have collapsed following the withdrawal of 
subsidies and liberalisation of output markets that has 
seen surges in imports of commodities such as rice and 
meat products. According to MoFA data, in 2003 the share 
of staple crops (maize, rice, sorghum, millet, cassava, and 
yam) in total arable crop area was 54% in Upper East, 
61% in Northern Region and 63% in Upper West Region. 
However, although much land is devoted to staple crop 
production, most of what is produced is consumed at 
home. According to GLSS4 (1998/9), 92% of rural house-
holds in Northern Region produced maize, but only 27% 
sold any. In Upper West and Upper East, over 90% of all 
households produced sorghum or millet, but only 8% 
sold any.
A critical development question for northern Ghana, 
therefore, is why households devote so many resources 
to semi-subsistence production of staple foods, rather 
than producing higher value crops for market8. Table 2 
presents indicative crop budgets for a maize-sorghum 
intercrop and for groundnuts in Northern Region. These 
show that the returns to labour from producing ground-
nuts comfortably exceed those from the maize-sorghum 
intercrop in a “normal” season, even when the purchase 
price is used to value grain (i.e. assuming that the house-
hold is food deficit). This suggests that production of 
staple foods is not a profit maximising strategy. However, 
MoFA data show that production of groundnuts has been 
increasing rapidly in Northern Region in recent years 
(mainly based on area expansion), whilst production of 
maize and sorghum has declined (due to yield falls as 
well as small contraction in area)9. This suggests that 
relative returns may nevertheless play some part in 
farmers’ cropping choices.
In a poorer year, the returns to the maize-sorghum 
intercrop and to groundnuts are comparable. Given the 
uncertainties around the data, it may be that some house-
holds continue to grow grains for fear that prices will be 
unaffordable during a poor year. In other words, they 
may feel that they are better off growing their own staples 
than specialising in the production of other crops for 
sale and relying on market purchases to supply their food 
needs. The evidence for this here is admittedly weak11. 
However, insofar as it does happen, there would be posi-
tive externalities from raising food production and stabil-
ising prices (at lower real levels than are currently 
observed) within the three northern regions.
Another possible explanation for the prominence 
given to staple food crops is that they respond differently 
to the main cash crops under particular rainfall conditions 
(most obviously drought). Simple correlations using 
MoFA annual data for 1995-2004 show that groundnut 
yields are negatively and significantly correlated with 
maize in Northern Region, which provides tentative 
support to this hypothesis. Meanwhile, perhaps surpris-
ingly, maize yields are positively and significantly corre-
lated with both millet and sorghum yields. A similar test 
for Upper West finds groundnut yields to be positively 
and significantly correlated with yam yields, but not with 
any of the main cereals, whilst millet and sorghum yields 
are negatively and significantly correlated with maize 
and rice. These relationships again provide some (limited) 
evidence for the risk-spreading hypothesis. In Upper East 
groundnut yields are positively and significantly corre-
lated with rice, whilst maize and sorghum yields are also 
positively and significantly correlated. 
A third explanation for the prominence given to semi-
subsistence production of food staples relates to social 
organisation. In all three northern regions, “households” 
are complex extended family units. Physically they are 
focused on a “compound” where the head (usually male) 
lives with his wife/wives, their sons, daughters-in-law and 
grandchildren (assuming that married sons have not 
physically moved out of the parental compound) and 
unmarried daughters. Within the so-called “compound” 
system found in these regions, the compound head has 
authority to demand labour from all other household 
members on the main compound food plot, so as to 
ensure a basic level of staple food supplies for the whole 
household. These reciprocal obligations continue even 
if a married son physically moves out of the parental 
compound12. When the head dies or becomes too infirm 
to carry out his food producing responsibility, this respon-
sibility - plus the authority to call on labour - passes onto 
the eldest son.
Table 2. Indicative Budgets for Maize-Sorghum Intercrop and Groundnuts in Northern Region
Normal Year Scenario Bad Year Scenario
Maize Sorghum Groundnuts Maize Sorghum Groundnuts
Yield (kg/ha) 820 710 880 600 550 610
Price (US$/ton) 200 200 500 300 300 660
Gross Rev. (US$/ha) 306 440 345 403
Cash Costs 77.8 96 77.8 96
Net Rev. (US$/ha) 228.2 344 267.2 307
Labour (days/ha) 95 103 95 103
Returns to labour 2.4 3.4 2.8 3.0
Notes: yield figures are 2000-2004 averages and minima respectively in Northern Region (source: MoFA); maize-
sorghum intercrop assumes full yields are achieved for each crop; cash costs and labour input estimates are based 
on MoFA indicative budgets; maize prices are indicative purchase prices for a deficit household10.
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Binswanger and McIntire (1987) suggest that social 
institutions are a response to a combination of a) risk 
and b) failure in the markets (especially insurance, savings 
and credit) that could otherwise protect people against 
this risk. Pooling social institutions, such as the compound 
system, are particularly well suited to absorbing idiosyn-
cratic risk, for example embedded labour risk in areas 
historically prone to disease. However, in addition, whilst 
they can only offer imperfect protection against covariate 
risks, they may still be the best available protection 
against these. Unless anthropologists whom we are 
unaware of have researched this, the specific reasons for 
the rise of the compound system in the Guinea savannah 
and Sahel zones of West Africa are matter of conjecture. 
Our observation is that idiosyncratic risk is less of a char-
acteristic of these zones than covariate rainfall risks (too 
little rain or a very short rainy season). In the case of a 
very short rainy season, the compound system has the 
advantage of rapid mobilisation of labour on the house-
hold food plot. Historically, strength in numbers may 
also have been an advantage in a dangerous and sparsely 
populated region.
The compound system can thus be thought of as an 
informal social protection system. However, as with all 
such systems, it comes at a cost: it imposes constraints 
on agricultural diversification by compound members. 
On the one hand, there is a cultural expectation that a 
good head will provide his household with grain from 
own production; on the other, junior household members 
can only grow other crops (which they control and can 
either eat or sell) in times when their labour is not 
demanded on the household food plot. The resulting 
low and/or untimely labour input can reduce yields on 
other (higher value) crops. However, Labour gangs in 
communities (usually formed by junior household 
members) have evolved to enable them cope with this 
labour constraint.
North (1990) observes that informal institutions (of 
which the compound system is again a good example) 
tend to evolve slowly. Thus, they may evolve in response 
to a particular problem of market failure (e.g. thin and 
unreliable food markets in northern Ghana, combined 
with absent markets for insurance and credit), but may 
then be slow to change even if the efficiency of food 
markets improves. Thus, even if households would be 
better off producing groundnuts for market and using 
the proceeds to buy maize and if food markets now oper-
ated well enough for that to be a safe strategy, the 
compound system could continue to encourage maize 
production. Some evidence in support of a gradual insti-
tutional change hypothesis is that the compound system 
is evolving. One generation ago, the responsibility of the 
household head was to provide staple food for all house-
hold members for two meals per day; now the respon-
sibility only covers supper13. This gives households 
greater flexibility in sourcing more food from the market. 
Sub-units now have responsibility for two meals per day 
and labour obligations to the wider household are only 
to grow enough food for one.
Observers of agriculture in northern Ghana highlight 
the following key constraints to increasing production 
of staple food crops:
Limited irrigation development; •
Limited adoption of improved seed varieties; •
Limited use of fertiliser. MoFA data show high maize  •
prices in Ghana (see Table 2)14. However, as local ferti-
liser prices are close to US$500/ton, if we assume a 
conservative response ratio of 5kg maize per kg ferti-
liser15, then the VCR for fertiliser application is still only 
two, which makes fertiliser application a marginal 
proposition. Even where fertiliser application is clearly 
profitable (most likely in areas close to major centres), 
the lack of seasonal credit limits the number of house-
holds that can afford it;
Limited use of animal traction, which is in turn a func- •
tion of the unequal ownership of oxen15 (see Table 1 
above). Where a household has to rely on hand hoeing 
to prepare land, they can rarely cultivate more than 
two acres per active member, given the short time 
window available for land preparation following the 
onset of the rains. Otherwise, land is still fairly plentiful 
in much of Northern and Upper West regions.
These observations suggest asset thresholds that 
households need to cross (associated in particular with 
animal traction ownership) if they are to enjoy high cereal 
yields on a regular basis and hence invest significantly 
in production of higher value crops for market.
This discussion has not provided conclusive evidence 
on the central question as to why households in northern 
Ghana devote so many resources to semi-subsistence 
production of staple foods. However, it has suggested 
that:
production of staple foods is not a profit maximising  •
strategy;
some households may continue to grow grains for fear  •
that prices will be unaffordable during a poor year. 
Insofar as this is true, there could be positive externali-
ties from raising food production and stabilising prices 
within the three northern regions;
crop diversification (not devoting the entire cropped  •
area to a single, high-return crop such as groundnuts) 
helps protect against rainfall risk;
the compound system is a social (non-market) institu- •
tion that encourages maize production and thereby 
imposes constraints on agricultural diversification by 
compound members, albeit to a lesser extent than a 
generation ago;
there are asset thresholds that households need to  •
cross if they are to enjoy high cereal yields on a regular 
basis and hence invest significantly in production of 
higher value crops for market.
Below we consider whether social protection interven-
tions could assist households to devote more resources 
to production of higher value crops in the light of the 
reasons for semi-subsistence staple food production just 
discussed.
We also note that, having focused until recently on 
promoting agricultural growth (implying the targeting 
of resources to high potential agricultural areas, albeit 
ones that have perhaps suffered from relative under-
investment in the past), the national Food and Agriculture 
Sector Development Policy, FASDEP, is currently being 
revised to give additional weight to the objective of 
poverty reduction among smallholders. In the 2008 
budget Statement, Government has introduced a 
northern development fund with seed money of 25 Mill 
Working Paper 009 www.future-agricultures.org5
Gh Cedis, (about US$25 mill). This is a clear response to 
growing debate about increasing poverty in the three 
northern regions and the growing disparity in develop-
ment between north and south of the country. It remains 
to be seen the how this fund will be used.
Brief History of Social 
Protection Policy in Ghana
The history of social protection policies and programmes 
in Ghana is not a systematic one that shows an evolution 
of policies and programmes over time. Rather 
programmes have been implemented from various 
angles by different stakeholders and interests. National 
development policies in the 1990s have identified the 
need for the protection of vulnerable groups, implemen-
tation has not been realised.
The most obvious social protection interventions are 
those implemented through food aid and food for work 
programmes largely initiated by the donor community 
such as the USAID’s PL480 Title II programmes, under 
which grants are made in agricultural commodities to 
meet relief requirements and for activities to alleviate 
the causes of hunger, disease, and death. The US food 
aid programme is implemented by the Catholic Relief 
Service, Adventist Development and Relief Agency and 
Technoserve. The CRS, whose mission was established 
in 1956, distributes food aid through direct feeding 
projects, including maternal and child health activities, 
institutional feeding such as school lunch and take-home 
rations for girls. Other projects include farmer training 
and general relief for disaster victims, and vulnerable 
groups such as the elderly.
The Adventist Development and Relief Agency got 
involved in the Title II programme during the 1983-84 
food crises in Ghana. In 1985, ADRA expanded its relief 
programme to include development oriented activities. 
It has provided food through agro-forestry (tree seedling 
and food crop planting), school, latrine, and well construc-
tion, and general relief to disaster victims, elderly, and 
other vulnerable or needy groups. Since 1988, ADRA has 
provided food-for-work as part of an agro-forestry project 
in which selected rural communities plant tree seedlings 
for later harvest and sale as firewood.
Technoserve has monetized food aid to support agri-
cultural income generating activities intended to enhance 
food security through agricultural income-generating 
activities. Technoserve has used monetization funds to 
assist rural businesses in palm-oil processing and 
marketing, cereals marketing, and non-traditional export 
development. Technoserve delivers its assistance through 
various agro-based cooperatives. The cooperatives 
provide rural employment and income for farmers, proc-
essors, transporters, and numerous others.
While CRS and ADRA programmes may target the poor 
and vulnerable, the same cannot be said of Technoserve’s 
projects, as the NGO has the principle of promoting the 
‘entrepreneurial poor’. Certainly this group must have 
some assets to be already engaged in some form of 
economic activity, which Technoserve can then 
support.
All three NGOs do collaborate with public sector, espe-
cially the Ministry of Food and Agriculture (in the case 
of ADRA and Technoserve) and Ghana Education Service 
in the case of CRS; but the collaboration is only at the 
local level. In Bongo in the Upper East region, CRS collabo-
rates with the District Assembly through joint program-
ming. ADRA also relies on field staff of the District 
Directorates of Agriculture to deliver its agriculture 
related services. To date, the NGOs have not influenced 
policy of Ministry of Food and Agriculture towards social 
protection.
A study of distribution of the US food aid in Ghana 
revealed that, (1) direct feeding projects were misman-
aged and did not contribute to development and (2) 
that the Ministry of Agriculture’s plans for achieving food 
security did not include long-term continuation of direct 
feeding programmes for vulnerable groups such as disa-
bled persons, refugees, pregnant women, and children. 
Instead, the Ministry’s focus was on increasing food 
production and raising the income of Ghanaians.
The World Food Programme also has emergency and 
non-emergency feeding programmes. The World Food 
Program activities include food-for-work projects for 
railway, port, highway, and feeder road construction; 
supplementary feeding and nutritional education 
projects; and emergency food distribution for refugees. 
WFP’s goal is to phase out of external food aid by 2010 
and ensure that successful food aid programmes are 
sustained through local production17. This strategy will 
complement very well Government’s own school feeding 
programme which has the principle of local sourcing of 
food to boost agricultural production.
The most well known government initiated social 
protection programme in the 1980s is the Programme 
of Action to Mitigate the Social Cost of Adjustment 
(PAMSCAD). The programme was conceived in 1987-88 
as a safety net for those adversely affected by structural 
adjustment reforms following criticisms that the poor, 
and particularly non-export crop farmers were adversely 
affected by the structural adjustment programme.  The 
programme included 23 projects grouped into five 
categories - employment generation; community initia-
tive projects; help to the redeployed; basic needs for 
vulnerable groups, and education (World Bank, 1992). 
According to this World Bank Evaluation report, PAMSCAD 
was a serious attempt to provide help to vulnerable 
groups. However, the programme’s effectiveness was 
limited by design weakness some which were that, (i) it 
contained too many projects relative to the capacity of 
donors and the Government to implement; (ii) the 
programme did not target the poorest groups; (iii) there 
were too many donors for some projects; and (iv) the 
long term elements of PAMSCAD should have been 
implemented as part of the Government’s regular public 
investment program (World Bank, 1992, p23).
Other commentaries suggest that PAMSCAD was used 
to alleviate the then government’s political problems by 
providing disgruntled Ghanaians (e.g. dismissed/
retrenched civil servants) with compensation payments. 
As a result, the resources were spread very thinly and it 
failed to make an impact (World Bank 1992, Herbst 1993). 
PAMSCAD was also bedevilled by administrative prob-
lems arising from lack of capacity in the rural areas, which 
were supposed to be the focus of the programme. 
However, PAMSCAD funds have continued to support 
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initiatives for the small enterprises18. Our own observa-
tion is that if projects were to provide safety nets to those 
affected by structural adjustment, then PAMSCAD could 
not be classified as a social protection programme which 
involves more than the provision of safety nets.
Under Vision 2020 (1996-2020), government was to 
‘develop a comprehensive, sustainable and cost-effective 
social support system, especially for the disadvantaged 
and vulnerable’19.  However, poor coordination between 
the lead institutions, combined with budgetary alloca-
tions below what was required to achieve programme 
objectives, meant that the vision was not implemented 
successfully. No social support system was developed 
within the plan period.
Rural agricultural producers and their children were 
one of thirteen groups of vulnerable and excluded 
persons identified in the Ghana Poverty Reduction 
Strategy (GPRS), which replaced Vision 2020. The problem 
analysis of the strategy highlighted the extremely low 
and fluctuating incomes of the average farmer and lack 
of viable alternative economic activities, whilst the 
northern savannah was singled out as the most vulner-
able. However the state interventions were expansion 
of social security schemes, upgrading of slums, disaster 
management and coordination of service delivery, 
thereby excluding those with agriculture-based liveli-
hoods from the reach of state interventions.
GPRS II (2006-09) specifies a social policy framework 
for mainstreaming the vulnerable and excluded in human 
resource development. The policy areas are integrated 
child development including early childhood develop-
ment policy and child protection; strengthening the 
family (e.g. family life education); HIV/AIDS; capacity 
development in social work and volunteerism; and 
strengthening institutions and improving their 
coordination.
Social Protection through 
Agriculture
Agriculture projects with a social protection flavour are 
those implemented under IFAD’s Ghana Strategy. IFAD 
has since 1981, financed loans and grants worth USD 
155 million in 13 projects, out of which five were imple-
mented in three northern regions. IFAD’s country 
programme aims to achieve improved, diversified and 
sustainable livelihoods for the rural poor, particularly for 
those people dependent on marginal lands, for rural 
women and for vulnerable groups. Through these proj-
ects, IFAD has facilitated protection of livelihoods of these 
vulnerable groups. Projects in the north have focused 
on micro-credit for women, small dams for dry season 
farming, and land conservation, all of which aim to 
enhance resource base for the livelihood of the poor. 
Development of participatory institutions such as Water 
Users’ Associations on small dams, or women’s groups 
for credit, have been successful in including the poor in 
decision making in the development process (IFAD, 
2006a; 2006b).
Some of the key lessons from IFAD’s programme that 
are of relevance for an agriculture leveraged social 
protection programme are:
Geographic targeting for poverty reduction is appro- •
priate in the Ghanaian context because of substantial 
uniformity of poverty within rural communities, partic-
ularly in the north.
Private goods are not easily accessible to the very poor.  •
In order to reach this subgroup and to respond to the 
need for financing for investments in agricultural 
production, marketing and processing, grants may be 
a more effective instrument.
Building strong pro-poor institutions, whether tradi- •
tional or modern, formal or informal, is the most 
sustainable way to combat poverty with respect to all 
areas of action, including rural finance, microenterprise 
development, agricultural production, marketing and 
processing, and community-based organizations 
(IFAD, 2006c, p.7).
The Sasakawa Global 2000 programme is often 
thought as a social protection intervention in the coun-
tries in which they were implemented. However in Ghana, 
unlike the IFAD projects, the Sasakawa Global 2000 
project was designed to increase agricultural production 
in the country, focusing on dissemination of packages 
of maize and sorghum production technologies. The first 
project of SG 2000 began in 1986 in Ghana. The 
programme was implemented with Ghana’s Ministry of 
Food and Agriculture, through the Agricultural Extension 
Services Department. Maize was promoted in the south 
and central parts of the country while sorghum was 
promoted in the drier north. An important observation 
as far as social protection is concerned is that there was 
no targeting, though it is reported that agro-ecologies 
best suited for agricultural intensification were given 
priority20. Indeed because the programme was based on 
credit, and managed by extension officers, the poor and 
vulnerable farmers were not likely to have been selected 
to participate in the programme.
The programme strategy was to organize, field demon-
strations of improved crop technologies in collaboration 
with the Ministry of Agriculture. The production unit was 
the production test plot (PTP) of 0.5ha or 1.2 acres. 
Farmers were provided a recommended package of 
fertilizer, improved seed, and in some cases, pesticides 
for post-harvest grain storage) on credit provided by SG 
2000. The programme’s initial success in terms of numbers 
of farmers participating, area planted to improved seed, 
and crop yield was marred by inadequate institutions to 
support its rapid expansion. Starting with 40 production 
test plots in 1986 the programme quickly expanded to 
15,000 in 1988 and by 1989, there were 76,000 plots or 
farmers. The national extension service that managed 
the distribution of inputs and was responsible for loan 
recovery, was overwhelmed by the rapid increase in 
numbers. Loan recovery dropped from over 90% in 1986 
and 1987 to 44% in 1989.
The programme was re-designed in 1990/1991 with 
a scale down to 5000 plots, and crops diversified to 
include rice, cassava and cowpea. The programme re-de-
sign also re-oriented efforts towards engaging the private 
sector (e.g. Agriculture development Bank for credit 
instead of public funds; and input dealers for distribution 
of inputs instead of extension staff). Unfortunately the 
programme’s crises occurred during a period when major 
policy shifts in input distribution and pricing, and 
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financial market liberalisation were taking place, and 
there were no programmes to ease the transition from 
public to private input marketing. 
These experiences underscore the importance of well-
functioning market institutions, and a conducive 
economic environment to programmes focused on agri-
cultural production. Poor access to markets in the face 
increased production can lead to collapse in prices and 
subsequent default by farmers participating in credit 
programmes. 
Existing Social Protection 
Programmes
Besides traditional social protection arrangements of 
different cultures across the country, public social protec-
tion policies and programmes have included social 
transfer programmes, labour market interventions (such 
as minimum wage, employment creation for youth and 
regulations to protect interest of workers) social insur-
ance programmes and schemes targeting women and 
children.
Existing social protection interventions are listed 
below21.
Supplementary Feeding •
Preventive Health Care Programmes (Malaria Control,  •
I m m u n i s a t i o n  a n d  M i c r o - n u t r i e n t s 
supplementation)
National Health Insurance (this was introduced in  •
2003)
Micro-Finance •
Disaster Management •
Social Security Pension Schemes for Formal Sector.  •
Emergency Relief •
Social Assistance e.g. health exemptions, Support to  •
children in need of special care and protection, 
Capitation Grants to basic schools, School Feeding
Skills Training and Employment Placement (STEP) and  •
Other Vocational Skills Interventions
National Labour Standards  •
Agriculture Extension Services •
As is the case with the US Title II programme discussed 
above, some of these interventions (e.g. micro-finance, 
supplementary feeding and irrigation) are also initiated 
and implemented by NGOs.
Gaps identified in current social protection interven-
tions include:
Limited Coverage of some Interventions •
Limited support to informal sector •
Weak targeting mechanisms in some interventions •
I n a d e q u a t e  i n t e r - s e c t o r a l  l i n k a g e s  a n d  •
co-ordination 
Weak institutional capacity •
Low cost efficiency and effectiveness  •
Limited recognition of gender considerations •
Over concentration on protection. •
Recognising this, the Government of Ghana has 
produced a Social Protection Strategy that aims:
“to provide a coherent National Social Protection 
Framework to help lift the socially excluded and 
vulnerable from situations of extreme poverty and 
to build their capacity to claim their rights and 
entitlements in order to manage their livelihoods, 
to make their contributions and meet responsibili-
ties towards national development.” (info.world-
bank.org/etools/docs/library/152905/
GhanaSPStrategy.pdf). 
National Social Protection 
Strategy
The National Social Protection Strategy (NSPS) was 
produced by the Ministry of Manpower, Youth and 
Employment in March 2007. Noting that “uncoordinated 
delivery and poor targeting of most of the existing inter-
ventions have resulted in limited coverage and impact” 
(p10), it aims to target systematically the “extreme poor” 
in Ghana, estimated at 14.728.6% of the population 
(based on GLSSIV3)22. The main instrument for achieving 
this is a Livelihoods Empowerment Against Poverty 
(LEAP) social grants programme, which has been under 
development during 2007.
Drawing on a previous Poverty and Social Inclusion 
Assessment (PSIA), NSPS is based on the premise that 
“the roots of poverty are found in the multiple social risks 
faced by the poor, and in their vulnerability to the impact 
of these risks” (p11). Thus, the LEAP social grants will assist 
the poor “to reduce, ameliorate, or cope with social risk 
and vulnerability”.
NSPS envisages LEAP cash transfers as being uncon-
ditional to “individuals with no productive capacity e.g. 
the elderly poor, persons with severe disabilities etc.”, but 
in other cases being conditional on:
enrolling and retaining all school going age children  •
in the household in public basic schools. This will 
enable the children to benefit from an ongoing School 
Feeding; Program. Their costs of attendance will be 
met out of an Education Capitation Grant system, 
which started as a pilot in 2004 and is now nationwide. 
The grant is made to schools to cover the costs of 
teaching pupils from poor households;
all members of the household being registered within  •
the National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS). 
Recipients of LEAP grants will be expected to pay their 
NHIS contributions out of their grant receipts;
new born babies (0 -18 months) within the household  •
being registered with the Birth and Deaths Registry, 
attending required post natal clinics and completing 
an Expanded Programme on Immunisation;
no child in the household being trafficked or engaged  •
in any activities constituting the Worst Forms of Child 
Labour.
Underlying the conditionalities is the desire for LEAP 
to ensure that beneficiaries increase their access to 
education and healthcare, so as to break inter-genera-
tional poverty cycles: “household poverty undermines 
children’s nutrition and educational attainment, limiting 
their future prospects” (p12). However, as the detailed 
report of the LEAP design mission has yet to be released23, 
it remains to be seen whether these conditionalities will 
be implemented in practice. Experience in other coun-
tries suggests that a high level of administrative capacity 
(involving coordination across health, education and 
MMYE) is required to monitor compliance with such 
conditions.
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More immediately, the cash grants aim to provide 
beneficiaries with basic livelihood security, thereby 
increasing their ability to plan for the future and freeing 
them “to engage in productive activities to support them-
selves and ultimately contribute to national develop-
ment” (p12), including adopting more risk-taking 
livelihood strategies. Ultimately, it is hoped that LEAP 
beneficiaries could become micro-credit clients, so as to 
further develop their livelihood strategies. The PSIA iden-
tified small-scale farmers as a leading vulnerable group 
in the country, due to the multiple risks they face. It also 
highlighted a link between gender and poverty, with 
women farmers being noted as being among the poorest 
in society. As a result, “Subsistence Farmers and Fisher 
folk” are the first of five target groups for LEAP and are 
estimated to account for close on half of the eventual 
beneficiary population (360,00024 out of just over 
800,000). The other beneficiary groups are the extremely 
poor above 65 years, care givers (those looking after 
Children Affected Bby AidsAIDS, children with severe 
disabilities and other incapacitated or extremely poor 
people living with HIV/AIDS) and Pregnant Women or 
Lactating Mothers with HIV/AIDS.
It has recently been announced that the basic grant 
will be c80,000 (US$8) per household per month. Based 
on similar figures, NSPS estimated the total cost of the 
LEAP scheme at US$23-27M p.a. (c.0.21% GDP), of which 
80-90% would be the grants themselves (this proportion 
rising once sensitisation, institutional strengthening and 
monitoring systems have been put in place). NSPS envis-
ages that payment to beneficiaries will be made through 
the Association of Rural Banks, which has membership 
institutions in every district in Ghana. Beneficiaries (or 
their representatives?) will be expected to collect their 
money from the relevant local institution.
Potential Complementarities 
Between LEAP and 
Agricultural Development in 
Northern Ghana25
One omission from the NSPS is details of how beneficia-
ries will be identified. It is stated that a “quasi-exhaustive 
survey approach” will be used to establish who qualifies, 
but the “pre-established eligibility criteria” are not speci-
fied (p45). This is something on which the design team 
report is expected to present recommendations, although 
it is also potentially politically sensitive.
Eligibility criteria are critical to the impact of LEAP on 
both poverty and agriculture in the three northern 
regions. Given the concentration of poverty in these 
regions, uniform national targeting criteria will lead to 
a large share of available social grants being disbursed 
in these regions. This, however, requires strong political 
will. , especially from a government whose parliamentary 
majority is firmly rooted in the south. The experience of 
PAMSCAD related above does not bode well for unam-
biguous targeting of LEAP grants to the poorest house-
holds within the country; nor do initial wrangles between 
donors and government over how many districts the 
scheme should be piloted in (with donors receiving 
advice that ten would be sensible and government 
arguing for fifty and eventually settling for twenty-one). 
A national targeting policy, of course, requires both clear 
and simple targeting criteria that are applicable country-
wide26 and the capacity to administer these. In the 
absence of one or other, a fallback solution could be to 
use participatory, local identification of beneficiaries, as 
in Zambia (Schüring 2007). However, in Zambia these 
lead to a set proportion of households in each area 
receiving support. This can be reasonably consistent with 
national poverty targeting as long as the scheme is only 
operated in selected areas, but not if it is ultimately 
intended to be rolled out country-wide.
A related issue of particular relevance to the northern 
regions is the question of targeting within complex 
households (compounds). There are two dimensions to 
this. Firstly, LEAP grants will be distributed on a per house-
hold basis, so whether a sub-unit within a compound 
qualifies as a household or not matters. Secondly, we 
observe that the processes of decision making and 
bargaining within complex households – for example, 
following a weather shock – are little understood. 
However, there are grounds for believing that later wives 
and their offspring might be the most vulnerable to food 
insecurity during these times, either because they have 
least opportunity to build up their own “private” assets 
or (possibly relatedly) because their bargaining position 
within the compound is least well established. The ques-
tion then arises: can the most vulnerable sub-units be 
reached directly by social transfers or will such transfers 
have to go through the household head and be subject 
to the same intra-household bargaining processes that 
contribute to the vulnerability of the disadvantaged 
sub-units?
If LEAP grants are allocated according to local, rather 
than national, targeting criteria, then fewer resources 
will reach the three northern regions and the likelihood 
that the grants will benefit semi-subsistence farming 
households is reduced27. However, in what follows we 
assume that suitable national targeting criteria are devel-
oped and used. Under such circumstances, if the scheme 
aims to reach 1518% of the population considered 
extremely poor and 57% of the extreme poor are found 
in the three northern regions (see above), then around 
38% of the population of the three northern regions 
should receive grants28. Referring back to Table 1, this 
encompasses most of the so-called “poor” group, as well 
as the so-called “vulnerable” group.
As noted earlier, the so-called “vulnerable” group – 
many of whom fall into one of the LEAP target groups 
other than small-scale farmers - have only a modest 
engagement with agriculture. These households lack the 
labour and sometimes also the land – not just the ability 
to bear risk – to undertake crop production. As in Zambia, 
they might use a proportion of their grant funds to 
acquire poultry, goats or seeds. These are desirable 
outcomes in themselves, but are unlikely to take them 
over any critical asset thresholds to embark on sustain-
able, expanded agricultural production. For most house-
holds in this group, social grants are likely to fulfil primarily 
a welfare function.
By contrast, the “poor” group in Table 1 are engaged 
in semi-subsistence agriculture as a major livelihood 
activity and, moreover, see investment opportunities in 
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agricultural expansion (if only because there are relative 
few other opportunities open to them). It is indeed 
possible that access to social grants will enable them to 
expand their agricultural production activities. Having 
guaranteed access to some food during the “lean” pre-
harvest season could enhance their health and/or 
strength, making their labour more productive. It may 
also remove the need for mid-season diversion of labour 
away from cultivation so as to meet immediate food 
requirements. However, because of the way the 
compound system functions, this is less of an issue in 
northern Ghana than in, say, Malawi. Dynamically, access 
to grants may reduce the need for disinvestments in 
response to shocks, hence enabling households to retain 
and possibly build up their productive assets over time. 
On the other hand, it seems unlikely that the size of grants 
will permit poor households to hire much additional land 
or labour – the two main constraints to expanded produc-
tion by this group noted by MoFA (2007). Thus, the 
increase in agricultural production in northern Ghana 
as a result of LEAP could be modest.
Agricultural impact could perhaps be increased if the 
grants were concentrated during the production season, 
with a lump sum payment prior to planting being a 
possible way of enabling beneficiaries to afford either 
ploughing services (to expand cultivated area) or 
improved seeds or fertiliser (for higher yield). Further 
payments during the production season could perhaps 
then facilitate the hiring of labour or simply ensure that 
household members ate well enough to stay healthy 
and make the most of their own labour potential29. 
Drawing inspiration from the Employment Guarantee 
Scheme in India, NSPS notes that, “In Ghana, linkages 
will be established between LEAP and The Labour 
Intensive Public Works Programme, The Youth 
Employment Programme and The Cocoa Mass Spraying 
Programme to support the labour market.”30  The nature 
of these linkages is not specified. However, concentrating 
as many of these schemes as possible in the agricultural 
off-season would make it feasible to focus the grant 
money on the critical agricultural production season. In 
a northern Ghana context, public works schemes could 
usefully be used to maintain rural roads and construct 
or maintain small dams.
Given the uncertainties surrounding the possible 
production response by the “poor” group to social grants, 
it is also not possible to predict the impact on regional 
food markets of the LEAP programme. Indeed, food prices 
could go either up or down. With staple food production 
in Northern Region, in particular, broadly in line with 
current consumption (see earlier discussion), the critical 
question is whether additional production as a result of 
social grants will be greater or less than the additional 
demand stimulated by receipt of these grants. Of course, 
if additional production exceeds additional consump-
tion, the resulting lower real food prices will generate 
significant additional benefits for poor households. 
However, if prices rise, this will erode the real value of 
the grants to beneficiaries and disadvantage many 
non-beneficiaries.
Finally, we observe that, in the predominantly agri-
cultural north of Ghana, social grants will only be one 
step to lifting extreme poor households out of poverty. 
As MoFA (2007) showed, poor households in receipt of 
additional capital may well invest much of it in agricul-
ture. However, as the GLSS surveys show, under current 
circumstances semi-subsistence agriculture is not a reli-
able way to exit poverty. For agriculture in northern 
Ghana to realise its poverty-reducing potential, an 
improved agricultural policy is also required. More invest-
ment is required in irrigation, rural roads, extension and 
veterinary services. A complementary policy to agricul-
turally-targeted social grants for the “poor” group would 
be the provision of animal traction hire services to LEAP 
beneficiaries31, something that could perhaps be piloted 
by an agricultural NGO. In the longer term, assistance 
towards the acquisition of cattle, training of oxen, subsi-
dies or loans for ploughs would also be useful.
Ultimately, NSPS hopes that LEAP beneficiaries can 
become micro-credit clients. However, very little progress 
has been made in developing micro-credit schemes to 
support smallholder agriculture (especially semi-subsist-
ence food production) anywhere in Africa, including in 
Ghana32. Our observation is that, even when micro-credit 
schemes to support smallholder agriculture do begin to 
expand, they will target the top smallholders first. We 
are a long way off developing schemes to reach the 
poorest 15% of farmers. NSPS recognises that “access to 
micro-finance schemes for the extreme poor remains a 
major challenge” (p57).
Overall, however, there could be useful synergies 
between LEAP and enhanced agricultural policy, with 
the former equipping poorer households to benefit from 
the latter. The returns to the two interventions together 
could, therefore, be greater than the sum of the two if 
implemented separately.
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End Notes
1 The P2 poverty measure using the lower (extreme 
poverty) line. Agriculture and Social  Protection in 
Ghana
2 According  to Shepherd et.al.  (2005), migrants  to  the 
main  southern  centres  from  the north on average 
earn less than counterparts originating from the forest 
zone (i.e. other southern regions) due to lower 
education levels and to strong ethnic networks 
controlling access to more remunerative jobs.
3 The fndings reported here are from a draft version of 
the report, which was based on analysis of data from 
districts in the three northern regions (12), Brong Ahafo 
(3) and Ashanti Region (1). The basis on which districts 
were sampled was not stated, nor the precise 
methodology for data collection, although this was 
based on participatory exercises with communities in 
the chosen districts.
4 This group might more typically be thought of as 
chronically poor.
5 Such assets may also have been poor quality. Thus, for 
example, if land was inherited, it may have suffered 
from poor soil fertility.
6 For example, the early part of the 2007 farming season 
(mid-May – June) in northern Ghana was characterised 
by a drought after some early rains in April and early 
May. When the rains resumed, many farmers replanted 
only for the crops to be washed away by foods. Many of 
these farmers are unlikely to recover without external 
assistance. 
7 The size of the hypothetical lump sum varied by 
group: 100,000-1 million cedis (US$11-110) for the 
“vulnerable” and “poor” groups; 1-10 million cedis 
(US$110-1100) for the “medium” group, and 10-50 
million cedis (US$1100-5500) for the “well-off” group.
8 Of course,  the same  labour and capital  resources 
could also be devoted  to non-farm activities. However, 
as noted in the previous section, these are perceived by 
many households to offer only limited opportunities at 
present, given their asset endowment.
11 The evidence may be weak but  in a culture where  
‘being responsible’  is measured by ability  to produce 
your staple food requirements, the argument is justifed.
12 This assumes that the son still farms nearby. The 
relationship changes if a son moves to a town 
(increasingly common) or to farm in a different area (e.g. 
some of the “frontier” land still available in northern 
Ghana). At  this point, emphasis  is mainly on  the  son  
sending  something  (cash or  in  kind) back  to  the 
parental compound. Note also that, in Upper East, the 
land rarely exists for married sons to move out. Thus, 
very  large numbers of people  (40+) can  reside  in 
single compound. Such concentrations are not often 
observed in Northern Region or Upper West, but the 
reciprocal relationships described above can still bind 
the same large numbers of people.
13 This  could  be  a  response  to  a)  increasingly  
effcient  food markets,  or  b)  increasing  non-farm 
income sources, or both.
14 MoFA data also show rising real food prices during 
the 1997-2004 period in constant 1997 cedi terms, but 
not  in US$  terms. Rising  real  food prices suggests  
that  food production has  increased more slowly than 
demand (the growth of which has been driven by both 
rising population and rising incomes in the south of the 
country).
15 This may be too conservative for improved maize 
varieties. However, if farmers are to use both improved 
seeds and fertiliser, they require reasonable savings as 
well as the willingness to bear risk. 
16 Obviously the very poor household do not own cattle 
and therefore are not likely to have oxen for ploughing. 
These fgures are consistent with an earlier MOFA Needs 
assessment study of private livestock holders (MOFA, 
2004), which shows that multiple roles livestock 
keepers, who are the very poor, do not own oxen.
17 Source: World Food Programme Country brief. (www.
wfp.org/country_brief/indexcountry. asp?country=288)
18 For example credit programmes  implemented by  
the National Board  for Small Scale  Industries even as  
recently as 2005, were fnanced with  residual  funds  
from PAMSCAD. Personal communication NBSSI Offcer 
in Bolga, Upper East Region
19 Republic of Ghana (1997). Ghana-Vision 2020. The frst 
Medium Term Development Plan (1997-2000),. National 
development Planning Commission, Accra. P.78, para. 
269.
20  http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/fertilizeruse/
documentspdf/GhanaSGDemoProgram.pdf
21 info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/152905/
GhanaSPStrategy.pdf
22 The  poverty  statistics    quoted  in  the NSPS  are  
based  on  the  4th Round  of  the Ghana  Living 
Standards Survey  conducted  in 1998/99 and  reported  
in 2000 by  the Ghana Statistical Service  (GSS). The 
fgure of 14.8% is not based on the GLSS data. In fact the 
5th round of the GLSS, conducted in 2005, estimates 
the proportion of extreme poor at 18.2%. 
23 The frst draft of the design team was submitted at the 
beginning of September and it was hoped that more 
precise details of how LEAP might work would be 
known in time for the drafting of this report, but as yet 
Government of Ghana has not approved the report of 
the design mission for general release.
24 This fgure quoted in the public announcement on 29 
November 2007, is 2000 households in 21 districts.
25 We focus on this because of the particular interests of 
our paper. Note, however, that enabling poor farming 
households to engage in more productive activity is 
just one stated objective of the LEAP scheme, albeit an 
important one.
26 We are not in a position to say what these should be, 
but suggest that housing (quality and foor area) are 
indicators that are worthy of further consideration.
27 A similar reduction in impact will be observed if there 
is maladministration of the scheme.
28 57% of 15% = 8.5% (of the national population); the 
three northern regions between them account for 22% 
of the national population.
29 Taking the US$8 * 12 = US$96 currently available for 
each household in the scheme, this could instead be 
disbursed as one payment of US$41,  followed by fve 
payments of US$11 each at monthly intervals.
30 The National Youth Employment Programme was 
established 2006 (p54) but progress to date is not clear  
from NSPS. A similar comment applies  to  the public 
works scheme. The national Mass Cocoa Spraying 
Programme was instituted by the Government in 2001. 
In 2004, the programme generated about 60,000 jobs 
for unemployed youth in cocoa growing communities 
(p54).
31 In a unimodal  rainfall system, where speed of  
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response  to  rainfall  is critical  to achieving good yields, 
households with their own animal traction capability 
prepare their own felds frst before considering hiring  
their  oxen  out  to  others. Such  services  are,  therefore, 
only  available  sub-optimally  late  through household-
household transactions.
32 According to NSPS, “The agricultural input support 
programme is a MOFA pilot programme that provides 
loans and agricultural inputs to poor small-holder 
farmers. … The programme supports a broad range of 
activities such as the provision of seeds, fertiliser, 
improved planting materials, irrigation facilities, 
breeding  stock,  beekeeping,  poultry  and  snail  
rearing,  processing,  storage, marketing,  and  training. 
… Eligibility  for assistance  is based on  the  
recommendations of  the PSIA  regarding  the  
characteristics of the poorest people, and  the applied 
criteria  include availability of  labour, ownership of  
land and  lack of capital.”  (p55). However, no  fgures are 
provided as  to  the  coverage of  this programme. Our 
enquiries suggest that twenty district across the 
country, based on two poorest district in each of the 
ten regions, were selected for the piloting of the 
pro-poor interventions…. (Personal communication 
with Dr Lawson Alorvor, PPMED, MOFA). So far, 
monitoring of the projects show mixed results and that 
the principle of the pro-poor interventions has not 
been understood in some districts.
Table 4: Proportion of rural households severely 
affected by different shocks and stresses, 2005 
to 2007
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